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ON ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC AS A TELECOMMUNICATIONS

LANGUAGE
Steven 0. Kimbrough
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

Ronald M. Lee
Department of General Business
The University of Texas at Austin

ABSTRACT
Interorganizational telecommunications-mediated messages are nearly always expressed either in natural language (via telephone, telex, electronic mail, etc) or through

specific protocols developed for the application at hand. Natural language expression is
powerful, flexible, equivocal, and not generally machine readable. Specific protocols have
a limited expressive power, are inflexible, can be unequivocal, and are machine readable.

This paper commences an exploration of the possibility of using a formal language for

interorganizational messaging. Such a strategy promises to combine the virtues of natural

language and of specific protocols for communication. Formal logic is a natural basis for
such a language. Recent developments in illocutionary logic (an extension of predicate

logic) bid fair to provide a sound basis for a formal language for business communications. The paper discusses these concepts and how they might be implemented.

INTRODUCTION
There is a considerable excitement about
telecommunications and about what can be done

with the new technologies that have recently become available (e.g., packet switching networks,
voice messaging, etc.) or are anticipated to be
available in the near-term (e.g., various ISDN
services). Not only are these new technologies
promising to provide cheaper or more efficient

services (e.g., as in using fiber optic media to
lower the cost of basic transmission), but there
are many who believe that communications

technologies can be and are being used to

provide firms with strategic advantage (See
Clemons, et al., 1984; Ives and Learmonth,
1984; Clemons and McFarlan, 1985; Wiseman,
1985; Rackoff, et al., 1985).

business, it should be kept in mind that there
are, and have long been, two worldwide, integrated, working and successful communica-

hons networks: telephone and telex. If the new
technologies and services are merely faster and
cheaper, that is interesting, perhaps even exciting. But what would be genuinely interesting is
the prospect of being able, with these new technologies and services, to do something radically
new or different. For example, what is exciting
about the advent of personal computers is not

that they are more powerful than minis and

maxis (they are not), or merely that they are
cheaper, for hardware is always getting cheaper.

What is significant is that microcomputers are

so cheap that they can be very widely dispersed;
that microcomputers have a very fast communi-

cations link with the terminals they support,

thereby permitting extensive use of graphics (as
in spreadsheet programs, at the very least); that
the base of people actively working to develop
applications for these machines has become
quite large; and so on. With microcomputers, as

In the face of what can be fairly characterized
as a spectacular array of new communication
technologies and services, and of high hopes for
sweeping changes in the way organizations do

with telecommunications, it is the prospect of
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what can be done with the technology rather
than the technology by itself that can generate

What we find exciting in the current telecommunications environment is the prospect that
advancing technology will make interorganiza-

excitement.

tional communications both more extensive and
more committed to machine processing, with a
concommittant increase in speed and efficiency.
The main goals of this paper are to explore a

With respect to new telecommunications offerings, perhaps the most commonly cited new and
different activities are telecommuting (working
at home instead of at the office) and teleconferencing. We note, however, that the examples
of strategic employment of telecommunications
(most prominently, American Airlines (AA) and
American Hospital Supply (AHS)) do not, in
any obvious way, rely on advanced communications technologies or services. Rather, they rely

different sort of technical strategy for inter-

organizational, machine-based telecommunications, and to begin to investigate how this idea
might be implemented.

on proven technologies creatively applied.

PROTOCOLS AND LANGUAGES

In both these cases, and we think in many
others, it is plausible to hypothesize that there

There are, at present, two ways by which firms
communicate with each other using telecom-

are two main characteristics for the success of
these applications. The first is that the computer and communications systems are being used
to replace a paper-based system (AHS, ordering
of hospital supplies) or a paper-telephone-based
system (AA, ordering airline tickets). The systems were designed not merely to pass infor-

munications systems: through natural language
(telephone, telex, voice messaging, electronic

mail,

fax) and through record passing

(electronic funds transfer, airline reservations,
newly developed factory and office automation
protocols). Under a record passing scheme,
communicating firms agree on the field struc-

mation, but to use the passed information to
perform some action (invoicing, ordering, etc.).

ture of the record (e.g., the first field is N bits
long, holds character data, and contains the

have long been used for such purposes, but unlike the AHS and AA applications, the receiving

name of the originating firm) and on various arrangements needed to make a special telecommunications network function properly (i.e.,

handset, telex printer) cannot process or

special protocols are developed).

both the AA and AHS applications the actiontaking was delegated to a machine that can read
and process information coming in from a network. Ordering and invoicing are done in
machine-readable fashion.

Natural language and record passing are largely

Of course, the telephone and telex networks
terminal devices in these networks (telephone

manipulate the messages they are given.

In

complimentary in that the advantages of one
tend to be the weaknesses of the other. Thus,
for example, natural language is powerful,
flexible, very widely available, but subject to
equivocation and not generally machine readable, while record passing is limited in its ex-

The second characteristic of these applications
is that they· can be described as interorganizational (Barrett and Konsynski, 1982; Rosenberg
and Barrett, 1985). In the AHS case, the valuedetermining communication takes place between AHS and various hospitals. The essential

pressive power to explicit conventions, is in-

flexible, is not nearly as available as the voice
(telephone) network, but is precise and machine
readable.

Ideally, organizations should have a way of
communicating with one another that combines
the virtues of both natural language and record
passing (or development of special protocols).
One way this might be achieved would be to de-

communications for airline reservation occurs
between a travel agent and the airline database. 1

velop technology that would make communi1

cated natural language machine readable, and
some success has been met with on this score
(Young and Hays, 1985).

The ideas presented here were conceived for inter-

organizational communications. Nevertheless, we believe
they can usefully be applied for intraorianizational communications, e.g., as add-on features for an office automation

environment, perhaps as an adjunct to electronic mail. We

We should like to suggest and discuss the
development of a different approach: com-

will explore this notion in future papers.
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municating by sending messages expressed in a
machine readable formal language that can also
Such a scheme
be understood by people.
promises to combine the best features of record
passing and natural language.

something;2 and emotive communications (e.g.,
"Throw the bum out!" or "Boo!") which merely
express a feeling. As discussed at length in that
paper, performatives and other expressions that
are not purely informative play a large and

Application-level protocols for computer com-

central role in business communications. Examples include orders, invoices, receipts, con-

munications via record passing have been in

place for some time and new protocols are constantly being invented and implemented. Examples are EFT protocols and airline reservation protocols.

Usually, these protocols are

specified by determining a sequence of fields in
a message and the allowable bit patterns within
the fields. While it is always possible and frequently useful to specify high-level protocols in

tracts, licenses and payments.

Performative and emotive communications (and
other not purely informative communications)
cannot adequately be captured in predicate
logic, but require some sort of extension to that

(formal) language. A main purpose of this
paper is to argue for the plausibility of our sug-

gestion (that interorganizational communica-

this fashion, there are certain advantages in tions be carried out, at least sometimes, using
moving from rigidly-defined protocols to lan- , sentences expressed in a formal language) by
guages for communication.
To illustrate, if we wished to have a system for
communicating certain facts, say stock prices,
we might use a language for doing so, saying
pric«Stock,Time,Bid), where "Stock" stands for
a particular stock, "Time" for a particular time,
and "Bid" for the price of that stock at that time.
Clearly, we could send an entirely equivalent
message by specifying a format or record strucThis approach, however, has disture.

advantages: rigidity, lack of extendibility, no
natural support for inferencing - all of which
we get with a predicate or statement. (The statement, "price(Stock,Time,Bid)," has the form of a

developing an initial analysis of the rudiments

of such a language that is sufficiently powerful
to handle transactions and other types of communications commonly encountered in business.

THE LOGIC OF
ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS
The purpose of this section is to present the

basic structure of the illocutionary logic

proposed by Searle and Vanderveken (1985).
(The literature on this subject also refers to the

topic as speech act theory.) Their work is imperfect and incomplete, but it is a very nice start

Prolog expression. Exploitation of this fact lies
at the heart of our proposal to use a formal language for communications.)

and well deserves the sort of testing that im-

plementing our suggestion will lead to.

The

work is, in any case, the most advanced formal
(logical) treatment of speech act theory. They
introduce their central concepts as follows:
In general, an illocutionary act
consists of an illocutionary force F
and a propositional content P. For
example, the two utterances "You will

So, by using a formal language and sending sen-

tences, we can hope to support inferencing
easily, and with it easy extension of the range of
expressions. But how far can we go? Predicate

logic has its limits, and Prolog (use of which we
shall assume in the sequel because it is the most

leave the room" and "Leave the

available programming language for representing statements in logic) cannot (directly) support
all proper inferencing in predicate logic. Extensions to predicate logic will need to be made. In
an earlier paper (Kimbrough, Lee and Ness,
1984) we distinguished informative, performative, and emotive communications: where
information communications (e.g., "The umpire
called him out") seem to have truth values; performative communications (e.g., (from an
umpire) "You're out!") do not seem to have truth
values, but are uttered for the purpose of doing

room!" have the same propositional
content, namely that you will leave

the room; but characteristically the
first of these has the illocutionary
force of a prediction and the second

has the illocutionary force of an or2with performatives. saying so makes it so. The umpire's

calling you out makes you out. Similarly, writing VOID on a
check actually voids the check.
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der.

Similarly, the two utterances

is that it be machine readable and is to be interpreted as having a truth value. At a minimum,

"Are you going to the movies?" and
"When will you see John?" both

then, expressions in Prolog (facts and rules)

could be collected as a propositional content in a

characteristically have the illocutionary force of questions, but have different propositional contents. Illocu-

speech act representation such as this. For
will be

present purposes, the content
represented by the Prolog predicate:

tionary logic is the logical theory of
illocutionary acts. Its main objective
is to formalize the logical properties

Content(<structure>).

of illocutionary forces (Searle and
Vanderveken, 1985, p. 1).

where <structure> is a collection of Prolog expressions that are to be interpreted declaratively.

For example, we might represent the content

Illocutionary acts include: making an assertion
of fact, asking a question, uttering a performative, making a promise, expressing emotion,
among other things. Promising and issuing per-

content((father(Steve),(male(X):- father(X)))).

most interesting concepts

The context of an illocutionary act is seen as a

"all fathers are males. Steve is a father." as:

formatives, along with stating facts, are the
from

speech act

theory for business and management applica-

5-tuple, consisting of: a speaker, a hearer, a

tions. If a logic of these utterances were avail-

able, then it would be possible to come to a

time, a place, and the world of utterance. The
first four elements are easily understood, so we

public agreement on the logic, to implement it

will not discuss them further. The last element,
the "world of utterance" is needed for technical

on local machines, and to have a precise,

flexible, available communications (formal) language for business that was machine readable.

reasons, and explaining them is beyond the pur-

poses of this paper.4

For present purposes,

think of the world of utterance as, in the expres-

sion of Searle and Vanderveken, "those various
other features of the speaker, hearer, time, and
place that are relevant to the performance of the
speech acts" (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p.
27). The context will be represented by the
Prolog predicate:

A successful system for business communication
requires a number of elements, including security privacy and authentication. We believe these
problems are well on their way towards satisfac-

tory solution (Even, el al.,1985; Chaum, 1985).
In what follows we assume that these issues,

particularly the authentication and receipt

verification issues, have been favorably
resolved. Let us now see, in outline, the basics
of the formal theory of illocutionary acts.

context(<speaker>,<hearer>,<time>,<place>,
<world>)

where each element is a Prolog term.

In the formal theory of Searle and Vanderveken, an illocutionary act is represented as a
triple, consisting of a propositional content, an

Finally, an illocutionary force is uniquely identified as a seven-tuple, consisting ofs:

illocutionary force, and the context of utterance.
Thus in Prolog we might have the form:3

1. the illocutionary point (pi) of which
there are five only: assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and
expressive.

ill act(<context>,<force>,<content>).

This, at the highest level, will be the structure of
the messages (utterances) to be passed between

parties. The propositional content can be any
expression (seen as either true or false) in predi-

4rhe world of utterance would need to be identified in an

cate logic, modal logic, or any of their standard

illocutionary act analog of a possible worlds semantics. The

extensions. The essential feature of the content

semantics for illocutionary logic have yet to be worked out

fully.
3We use the angle bracket convention as a metalanguage
expression to indicate that something must be filled in here.
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5The notations in parentheses (pi, degree, mode, prop,
sigma, psi, and eta) are that of Searte and Vanderveken.

useful.7

2. the degree of strength of the illocu-

Second, while there are important

issues having to do with representing the content and the context of an illocutionary act, the

tionary point (degree)

and
for
Searle
paramount
question
Vanderveken's proposed logic is whether the
representation of illocutionary forces is adequate, and in particular, whether the hypothesis
of constructability is correct, namely that:

3. the mode of achievement (mode)

4. the propositional content conditions
(prop)

...all...illocutionary forces are obtainable from the few primitive illoc-

5. the prepatory conditions (sigma)

utionary forces by applying opera-

6. the sincerity conditions (psi)

tions affecting the mode of achieve-

ment, the degrees of strength, the

7. the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions (eta)

propositional content conditions, the

prepatory conditions, or the sincerity

conditions of these primitive illocutionary forces (Searle and Vander-

For present purposes, we will represent an illocutionary force by the Prolog predicate:

veken, 1985, p. 51).

force(<pi>,<degree>,<mode>,<prop>,
<sigma>,<psi>,<eta>)

Like the decomposition move, the hypothesis of
constructability is best tested in the fire by the

sort of application proposed here. We believe,
however, that Searle and Vanderveken have

where each element is a Prolog term.6

made a plausible, workable first try and that
something close to their theory will prove ade-

Searle and Vanderveken use this scheme to
define five basic illocutionary forces, one for

quate.

each of the five points. They then argue that
every illocutionary force can be recursively
defined in terms of these five basic forces. In

The claims being made (by Searle and
Vanderveken) are intriguingly bold. While it is
clear that the logic of predicates cannot begin to
handle all the sorts of uses of language that we
have (stating facts, asking questions, issuing

fact, they give plausible definitions of more than
100 iliocutionary-force-indicating English verbs.
For example, a promise is a commitment with
the additional features that the speaker believes

commands, etc.), it is not obvious that there are

that what is promised is to the good of the

exactly five kinds of linguistic utterance. Searle
and Vanderveken claim that there are fun-

hearer and that the speaker in promising undertakes an obligation that might not be present in
the case of a commitment (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985, p. 192).

damentally just five. If this is correct, and if
the hypothesis of constructability is corrects

then it should be possible to implement a
remarkably stable and powerful formal language, based on the framework of illocutionary

Without examining the details of this proposed
logic for speech acts, what can we say about its
value?

logic. The following passage illustrates the idea.

First, the basic logical move made by

If we adopt illocutionary point as
the basic notion on which to classify

Searle and Vanderveken is to decompose a

speech act into a propositional content, an illocutionary force, and a context of utterance. The
usefulness of this move is best tested by attempt-

uses of language, then there are a

rather limited number of basic things
we do with language: we tell people

ing to apply it (and for that matter the rest of

how things are, we try to get them to
do things, we commit ourselves to do-

the logical apparatus) in specific cases, such as
the one under consideration. We are convinced,
however, that this basic move is indeed quite

7There is a forthcoming paper by Kimbrough and Lee in
which we present results of our initial investigations on this
score. Results are quite favorable.

61'he basic move being made here may be described as
follows. Whereas a modal operator (e.g., it is necessary that.

it is possible that) is a scater operator on a sentence, an

illocutionary force is a vector operator on a (declarative,

8In both cases, correct means true or close enough for

practical purposes.

truth-value holding) sentence.
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could change by adding (or deleting) definitions

ing things, we express our feelings
and attitudes, and we bring about

of illocutionary forces.

By the hypothesis of

constructability, all possible illocutionary forces
can be defined recursively in terms of the five
primitive forces. Thus, for example, buyers and
sellers might want to extend their langauge of

changes through our utterances. Of-

ten, we do more than one of these at
once in the same utterance (Searle,

1975).

offer by adding the force, "exploding_offer,"

Although changes to the formal language for
speech acts would occur by, for example, adding

more precise tools for expressing assertions, we

could be confident that the framework behind
the logic would not change, there being no sort

of thing we might ever say that could not be

defined in terms of the five primitive illocutionary forces.

which is a regular offer that is only good for 10
minutes after it is made. If the 10 minutes
elapse without acceptance of the offer, the offerer is committed not to make another offer on
the transaction at hand. The definition of
"exploding_offer" would be given in terms of a
standard offer plus prepatory conditions
(sigma).
Standard offers would have been
defined in terms of the primitive illocutionary
force, the commissive. By means such as these,

the offerer could send an explicit message indicating an exploding offer and the receiver of

the message could use the (publicly available)
definition to deduce the full meaning.

Envisioned Setups
The promise of a logic of speech acts is that with
such a formal language it will be possible to cap-

ture adequately the central concepts used in
business communications (e.g., receipts, invoices, etc.) and to do so in a way that is flexible
and extendable and that supports (correct, truth
preserving) inferencing. Were this available it
would be possible for different organizations to
buy, sell, negotiate, and canvas for goods and

TOWARDS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOGIC OF
SPEECH ACTS
In this section we present some initial results in

services, all by computer. Messages, expressed

analyzing important business concepts in terms

public network that supported authentication,

veken. Our purposes here are limited to analyzing, in a rough and largely informal manner,

in the formal language, would be sent on a
receipt verification, and the various conventions
and definitions associated with the language.

Individual firms would program their machines

to participate on the network in a way that

would work to the benefit of the firm. For ex-

ample, buyers would program their machines to
seek and negotiate the best bargain available,
given the firm's particular preference structure

(e.g., for cost vs. reliability).

Sellers would

the illocutionary point (i.e., category of illocutionary force) and the propositional content of
the following business concepts: inquiry, offer,
order, invoice, receipt, payment, and license.
The illocutionary point of an inquiry ("How
much do widgets cost?") is a directive (in the terminology of Searle and Vanderveken). The
speaker is directing (telling, requesting, order-

ing, commanding, etc.) the hearer to tell him

similarly program their machines to monitor the
market and to sell for the best available price

and delivery terms.

of the illocutionary logic of Searle and Vander-

something.

What that something is is the

propositional content. Using the Prolog conyen-

Once set in motion, an

tion of placing an uninstantiated variable

automated market would take effect. (For further elaboration, see Lee and Widmeyer, 1986.)

(beginning with an upper case letter) in a slot to

Although the underlying logic would remain

query about the price of widgets as:

indicate that the variable is to be matched, we
might represent the propositional content of a

constant, the language used for communication

(widget,Price)

9This is not to claim, of course, that additions to the

price-

Thus in a query regarding the price of widgets,
the illocutionary point would be directive and
the propositional content would be expressed
using the price predicate. Notice that in
responding to such a query, the respondent's utterance would have the assertive illocutionary

language to include tense, logic deontic logic, conditional
logic. intentional logic, etc., would be obviated. It is to
claim, rather, that any such additions would be expansions

of the range of expressions permitted as propositional content and thus would fit easily into the overall framework for

illocutionary logic.
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point and would also use the price predicate to

that because the message directing payment has

express the propositional content of that ut-

been tokenized it would be possible, as in the
case of paper-based checks, for the hearer to
pass along the electronic check and use it directly for payments the hearer desires to make.

terance.

It is worth noting that this structure
(illocutionary force & propositional content) is

(This, of course, assumes that the authentication
and receipt verification problems have been adequately solved.)

displayed transparently in Prolog commands.
The prompt, ?-, indicates illocutionary force
(the point is a directive) and the term or terms
following the prompt are the propositional content part of the expression.

Finally, a license is a declarative (aka,
peformative).
It confers certain rights or
privileges on the hearer. This may be done with
restrictions. For example, a driver's license

An offer is a conditional commissive.
An offer is a promise that is conditional on the hearer's acceptance.
An offer becomes binding only on acceptance. Roughly speaking, the logical form of an offer is: this speech

might have propositional content:

it is per-

mitted that you drive and you obey the state's
rules of the road. The permission is granted by
an appropriate declaration; you have the per-

mission if the right agent under the right conditions says you have the permission.

act commits me to perform a certain

course of action if it is accepted by
the hearer. Consequently, offer and
accept are reciprocal verbs. One's offer becomes binding only if it is accepted, and one can accept an offer
only if it has been made and has not
been withdrawn. These features, by
the way, are reflected exactly in the
English and American law of contract (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985,
pp. 195-196).

Prolog Formulation
We present here a simple (and simplified) ex-

ample of formalized commercial communications based on the illocutionary logic discussed
above. In particular, we will represent a query,
an offer, and an acceptance.

Suppose, for the sake of example, that Jones
and Smith are communicating about widgets
with Jones buying them and Smith selling them.
Both Jones and Smith participate on a network
run by an agent (another Prolog process) whom

An order is a species of directive. The propositional content describes the goods or services ordered (e.g., you send me 100 widgets). The illocutionary force indicator indicates a request (or
directive) that the fact described in the propositional content be brought into existence by the
hearer. A receipt is an assertive to the effect

we will call the Post Master. Messages pass
from the speaker to the Post Master and on to
the hearer. The steps to be formalized are, informally, as follows:
1. Jones sends a message on the net-

that the propositional content of the order has,
in fact, been made true. An invoice is a direc-

work inquiring of Smith what the
price of widgets is.

tive whose propositional content is that the
hearer pay the speaker.

The prepatory con-

ditions for an invoice (sigma) include the

2. Smith hears the message, reasons
that Jones may be interested in buying widgets since Jones is a frequent
customer of Smith, and replies with
an offer of widgets at $102.00 each.

propositional content of the receipt (and order).
A payment (e.g., a check) is a directive (an

order) to a third party for that party to pay the
The
hearer from the speaker's account.
prepatory conditions for the payment (sigma)

include the assumption that the third party has

3. Jones gets Smith's message, decides

speaker's account (e.g., that the speaker in fact

replies to Smith with an acceptance.

has his account at the third party's bank) and
that the speaker has sufficient funds in the account to cover the requested payment. Notice

Let us see, albeit somewhat incompletely, how
this can be formalized.

that the offer is a good one, and

the appropriate level of authority over the

21

In step 1, the speaker is Jones, the hearer is

Smith's database includes the Prolog statements

Smith, the time is 0, the place is Jone's address.

shown below, in additional to Jone's message.

The 'world content' will be here specified as a
simple message identifier, 91, as assigned by the
Post Master. Thus:

In this program, time/1 (the predicate time, the
arity 1) is a built-in predicate that always suc-

ceeds, that cannot be resatisfied, and that
returns the current time.
The predicate,

context(jones,smith,timeO,address_jones,91).

address/2, sets the address of the individual in-

The illocutionary force is an asking for infor-

dicated in its first argument.

mation (represented by ask) and has been

send_to_post_master_the_message(A,B),

defined in terms of a directive, a primitive illoc-

also a built-in predicate that is used for writing

utionary force. The definition is in a publicly
available program maintained by the Post
Master. Finally, the propositional content is:

messages to the network. If this predicate is set
as a goal and both A and B are instantiated, then
the message A is sent on the network to address
B, by forwarding both to the Post Master. The

price(widget,Value). The interpretation of this
predicate ("price(X,Y)" means that the price of
an individual X is SY) is also publicly available
and maintained by the Post Master. So, the
message that Jones puts out on the network to
inquire about the price of widgets is:

The predicate,
is

predicate, deal_A-if_B(A,B), would be publicly
defined (with the definition held by the Post
Master). Its interpretation is: There is an agreement that A and that B.
The "if" in the deal...predicate is present because
usually the predicate is used in the context of an
offer, which has a conditional commissive illoc-

ill_act(
context(jones,smith,timeO,address_jones,91), utionary point. The predicate, deliver(Seller,ask,
Buyer,Item,Each), is interpreted as: The Seller
price(widget,Value)
will deliver to the Buyer an Item at price Each.
Finally, the predicate, pay(Buyer,Seller,Item,Each), is interpreted as: The Buyer will pay the
Seller the amount Each for an Item. Like
Next, Smith receives the message, which is put
deliver and pay would be publicly
into a module of Smith's Prolog database. That deal_A_if_B,
d.
define
rules.
and
database contains other Prolog facts

In particular, there is a rule saying that if a

favored customer asks for the price of something we sell, then reply with an offer, rather
than reply, e.g., with a catalog quote.

favored_customer(jones).

So,

In step 3, Jones gets the answer, an offer, from
Smith, and determines what to do. Jones, in our
example, has a rule that says to accept any offer

/* Jones is a favored customer.
Other favored customers would be
indicated by similar statements.

The price of a widget for
favored_customer-price(widget, 102.00) /*
a favored customer is $102.00.
/* Now, reply. Other statements would normally have reply as head and have
other tails.

Overall structure:
reply :(cont...)

A,
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B,
C,
send_offer_message(W,X,Y,Z).
where A, B, C, W, X, Y, & Z are
Prolog terms.

reply :-

/* A */ ill_act(
context(Inquirer, smith, -, Inquirer_address,_),

ask,
price(Item,Each)),
/* B */ favored_customer(Inquirer),
/* c */ favored_customer-pric«Item,Each),
send_offer_message(Inquirer,Inquirer_address,Item,Each).
/ *W
X
Y
Z
*/

send_offer_message(Inquirer,Inquirer_address,Item,Each) :/*
Get the time: */
current_time(Time),
/*
Get the sender's address:
*/
address(smith,My_address),

/*

Determine the answer: */
Ans=ill_act(
contex«smith,Inquirer,Time,My_address,-j

offer,
deal_A-if_b(deliver(smith, Inquirer,Item,Each),
pay(Inquirer,smith,Item,Each))),
/*

Send the answer to the Post Master, addressing it to the Inquirer's
address on the network:

send_to_post_master_the_message(Ans, Inquirer_address).

Now, the illocutionary force, offer, would be
defined in terms of the primitive illocutionary

to sell widgets if the price is less than $105.00
and the offerer is a standard vendor for widgets.
So Jone's knowledge base looks like this:

force, commit, in such a way that if you offer a

standard_vendor(widget,smith). /*

Presumably, other statements would
be present to indicate other vendors.

reply:-

ill_act(context(offerer,jones)Offerer_address,_),

offer,
deal_a_if_B(deliver(Offerer,jones,Item,Each),
pay(jones,Offerer,Item,Each))),
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(cont...)

Item=widget,
Each=lt) 105.00
standard_vendor(Item,Offerer),
Deal=deal_a_if_B(deliver(Offerer,jones,Item,Each),
pay(jones,Offerer,Item,Each)),
send_accepLmessage(Offerer,Offerer_address,Deal).

send_accept_messag«Offerer,Offerer_address,Deal)
/*

Get the time: */
current_time(Time),

/*

Determine the sender's address: */

/*

>

:-

address(jones,My_address),
Determine the answer: */
Ans=ill_act(
context(jones,Offerer,Time,My_address,_),

accept,
/*

Deal),
Send the answer to the Post Master: */
send_to_post_master_the_message(Ans,Offerer_address).
Accepting the definitions
would be a consequence of agreeing to use their
defineinda when communicating on the network. In this way, electronic contracting might
beeffected.

deal_A_if_B(A,B) and the offer is accept (i.e.,
if the offeree replies with a proper accept illocutionary act, then the offerer is legally obligated
to do A and the offeree is legally (or
contractually) obligated to do B. Similarly, the
illocutionary force, accept, would be defined in
terms of the primitive illocutionary force, com-

publicly known.

deal--AJLB(A,B) and the offeree replies with
a proper accept, then the offeree is legally (or
contractually) we
obligated
to do B, once A is done.
Thus, in part,
would have:

when we note that not all the predicates have

mit, in such a way that if the offer is for a

obligated(Speaker,A,Hearer) :ill_act(context(Speaker,Hearer,_,_,_),
offer,
deal_A_if_B(A,B)),

This may seem like a long and complicated apparatus for such a simple exchange, especially
been defined and that in any realistic situation

the con lexity of the messages would be much
greater.
But the complexity is mostly the cost
of setting up the language. Once any contractual agreement can be made, the additional

work to arrange for another type of contract to

be supported is minimal.

For example, the

deal_A_if_B(A,B) predicate used here to make
and accept offers can take as arguments any
Prolog structures. To extend what they can say,

ill_act(context,(Hearer,Speaker,_,_,_),
accept,
deal_A_if_B(A,B)).
obligated(Hearer,B,Speaker) :ill_act(context(Speaker,Hearer,_,_,_),

all the communicating parties need to do is
come to some explicit agreement on the syntax
and interpretation of the structures to be used in

the arguments of deal_A-if_B. Also, given the

offer,

language setup, it is possible to provide fairly
simple definitions for important business concepts. ·For example, we might define Jones'
liabilities as the set of (Prolog predicates
finaladd, setof or bagof) A's and Agent's, such
that: obligated(jones,A,Agent). In these ways,

deal_A_if_B(A,B)),
ill_act(context(Hearer,Speaker,_,_,_),
accept,
deal_A_if_B(A,B)),
A.

The definitions of offer and accept, which we
shall not give in full because there is insufficient
space to present them adequately, would be
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larhere would be more checking to do. the offer would
have a more complex set of conditions, etc.

the range of expressions can be extended indefinitely.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Obviously much more analysis needs to be done

than can be presented in the space available
here (see Kimbrough and Lee, forthcoming, for

some of this analysis and its initial implementation in Prolog).

In addition, developing a

workable implementation of these concepts in
Prolog (or any other language) will involve a
great deal of work. We believe, however, that

the case in favor of having and using a formal
language for inter- and intraorganizational communications is a strong one. Employing illocu-

tionary logic (perhaps with modifications) appears to be a promising and feasible tack. The
framework of Searle and Vanderveken discussed

here, and the analysis of business concepts
presented in the previous section appear to fit
quite well together.
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Note
The main philosophical literature on speech acts
and related ideas can be found, or found in the
references, in Austin (1975) and in the several
works by Searle listed in the reference section
below. The work by Austin is an edited version
of his William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955. That work presents the results
of Austin's thinking on uses of language, over a
period of 20 years, and it is the most mature and
developed statement by Austin of his views on
performatives, speech acts, and related notions.
Searle's book, Speech Acts ( 1969) represents the

next major development in speech act theory in
the philosophical literature. The idea that there
are exactly five illocutionary points is first published in Searle's "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary
Acts" (1975). This idea is key to the formalization developed in Searle and Vanderveken

(1985).
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The information systems literature on speech
acts has heretofore been sparse and mainly
programmatic. Flores and Ludlow (198 1) dis-

cussed performatives in the context of office

automation. Lyytinen ( 1984) presents an overview of five approaches to the study of language,

including speech act theory, and argues that
these perspectives ought to be useful and used in

doing systems analysis.

Kimbrough, Lee and

Ness ( 1984) distinguish performative, informative and emotive expressions and argue that:
(a) performatives play a central and critical role

in business communications and (b) the infor-

mation systems literature has largely neglected
performatives. Lee (1984) and Stamper and Lee

(forthcoming) are additional works in this category.

